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Abstract
Short-term employment contracts have been deployed rapidly across the European
Union (EU) in the past two decades. Characterized by a high degree of flexibility, they
were thought to be the solution to persistent labor market rigidities and high unem-
ployment rates. The objective of this paper is to investigate both theoretically and
empirically the effects of introducing short-term employment contracts to the labor
market, and to draw conclusions regarding the change in welfare for different cate-
gories of people. Data from the Italian labor market show that workers hired on a
short-term basis are mostly young, female, inexperienced, less educated, and poorly
qualified. Short-term contracts, which are associated with lower wages, often come in
sequences. Labor force participation has increased in particular among older workers.
Such changes in labor force composition and transition patterns can be explained by
a search model with workers heterogeneity and differentiated contracts. In steady
state, a pooling equilibrium of less and more productive workers exists, when only
permanent contracts are available. In the presence of short-term contracts, a sepa-
rating equilibrium allocates less and more productive workers towards different career
paths. Through model calibration it is possible to quantify the change in welfare for
different categories of workers. Moreover, within a multi-state duration framework,
the model is estimated with the Heckman and Singer non-parametric maximum likeli-
hood (NPMLE) estimation procedure. One of the major findings is that inexperienced
workers are worse off after the reforms. However, after the accumulation of some work
experience, they have the opportunity to compensate for their losses, if they are more
productive. Less productive workers, even though provided with higher chances to
work, are the ones paying the cost of higher turnover and lower wages.
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1 Introduction
The recent economic downturn has caused a remarkable increase in unemployment rates both
in North America and Europe. Throughout the recent economic history, high unemployment
rates have been on the economic reform agenda of nearly all countries. In particular, young
workers face considerably higher unemployment rates than prime-age workers. This has
further increased the urgent need to identify solutions for boosting employment among this
demographic group. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that “in US historically one out
of every eight young workers was unemployed, a rate of unemployment more than two and a
half times that of prime-age workers”. In Europe the numbers are even more dramatic. Short-
term employment contracts, characterized by flexible employment features, were thought to
be the solution, and have been deployed rapidly in particular across the rigid EU economies.
Featuring short duration, lower costs, and more straightforward hiring procedures, they are
designated to be an agile instrument to increase labor market flexibility and, in turn, to
reduce unemployment. In this respect, Italy represents an excellent case study because of
the abrupt increase in the share of short-term contracts in the mid-nineties, followed by a
sharp decrease in the unemployment rate, in particular among young workers.
The objective of this paper is to investigate both theoretically and empirically the
effects of introducing short-term employment contracts to the labor market. The analysis
of the changes in the labor force composition and the transition patterns is the basis for
developing a search model, which captures these features and delivers conclusions regarding
the income change for different typologies of workers.
In agreement with the findings of Tealdi [27], I use data from Bank of Italy and the
National Social Security Institute to show that people hired short-term tend to be young,
female, inexperienced, less educated, and poorly qualified. The data indicate the existence
of a substantial wage premium for workers hired permanently, which is present even when
differences in education level, gender, age, working sector, geographical location, and occu-
pation are taken into account. I show that labor force participation and employment are
higher for older workers after the reforms. However, lower unemployment rates among young
workers come as a consequence of lower labor force participation.
Data alone are not sufficient to draw conclusions regarding the effects of introducing
short-term employment contracts. They indeed draw a purely descriptive picture of the
changes registered after the introduction of short-term contracts. In order to be able to
provide welfare conclusions, I develop a model, which replicates the patterns found in the
data. I extend a standard search model, in the spirit of Diamond [6], Mortensen [18], and
Pissarides [21], allowing for workers’ heterogeneity and differentiated contracts.
This model describes a pre-reforms economy, characterized solely by permanent con-
tracts and no possibility of firing, and a post-reforms economy, featuring the availability of
short-term contracts, that implies a higher degree of flexibility. In this set up, workers are
heterogeneous with respect to productivity. The productivity level of the workers is not
observed at the early stage of their working career, but rather at a later time, after the
accumulation of some work experience. When the productivity is unobserved, the workers
are inexperienced ; once it is observed, the workers become experienced. In the pre-reforms
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economy, the inability for firms to fire workers causes the creation of a pool of permanently
employed, with both high level and low level of productivity. This pooling is reflected in
the wage, which is a weighted average of the productivity of the two categories. In the
post-reforms economy, given the availability of short, cheaper, and more flexible short-term
contracts, young workers are hired temporarily, when they first join the labor force. At the
expiration of the short-term contracts, only more productive workers will be upgraded to a
permanent contract, receiving a higher wage. Less productive workers will have the chance
to keep working short-term, alternating spells of unemployment and temporary work.
The model is able to replicate closely the changes regarding the Italian labor market
composition. Performing the calibration of the model, I compute the income and the length
of the working career among different groups of workers. All workers spend more time within
the labor force. Moreover, I detect a substantial increase in wages and in income among more
productive experienced workers. In contrast, inexperienced workers as well as less productive
experienced workers are worse off in the post-reforms economy. In particular, less productive
workers are the ones paying the cost of lower wages and higher turnover. Considering the
entire working career of the individuals of both productivity levels, I find that after the
reforms the present value lifetime income is lower for less productive workers, but higher for
more productive workers.
There are several strands of literature related to this paper. This study is linked to
papers, which empirically analyze short-term employment contracts and their impact on the
labor market. In particular, the empirical literature on the topic1 tends to focus on the
way short-term contracts affect the transition patterns across contracts, the job and worker
turnover, and the unemployment duration2. This paper complements the existing literature,
providing a complete overview of the changes in the labor market since the mid-nineties, when
short-term contracts were introduced. I describe in detail the characteristics of workers hired
on a short-term basis and the evolution of labor force composition, transition patterns, and
wages for different categories of workers.
From a theoretical point of view, this paper represents the first attempt to quantify
the change in welfare due to the introduction of short-term contracts for different groups of
workers. A number of papers develop models to study the effect of short-term contracts on
the labor market and, in particular, on employment3. The model by Blanchard and Landier
[16] is the one that most closely resembles the model described in this paper. The authors use
a search model to investigate whether the introduction of short-term employment contracts,
common mostly among young workers, reduced the welfare for workers of age 20-24 in France.
I extend their set up considering the economy pre-reforms, when only permanent contracts
are available, and post-reforms, when both permanent and short-term contracts are present.
This allows me to illustrate the changes in workers’ behavior, induced by the availability of
1Berton [3], Berton, Devicienti, Pacelli [5], Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego [1], Giannelli, Jaenichen,
Villosio [15].
2Other important contributions to be mentioned are Guell [8] and Guell and Petrongolo [9] for the case
of Spain.
3Hopenhayn and Rogerson [13], Varejao and Portugal [22], Cao et al [25], Bentolila, Dolado et al. [24],
Bentolila and Saint-Paul [2], Berton and Garibaldi [4], Postel-Vinay and Cahuc [23].
3
contracts with limited duration in the same economy. Moreover, I include the whole sample
of workers (not only young), hence I am able to draw welfare conclusions across different age
groups.
In terms of methodology, this paper closely follows the search and matching literature
of Mortensen and Pissarides [19]. I extend the basic model to allow for heterogeneity on the
side of the workers and differentiated contracts. With respect to productivity, I follow the
approach used by Machin and Manning [17]. The authors introduce heterogeneity in terms
of productivity across workers and jobs in a search model to explain the increased wage
inequality in the US and UK. The authors show that the supply of more productive workers
can lead to lower unemployment rate and higher wages among this category of workers. I use
a similar framework to study how this result changes when short-term employment contracts
are present. This allows me to compare the labor force composition, transition patterns, and
wages before and after the reforms.
Finally, in terms of model estimation, this paper is also related to the literature on
the estimation of multi-spells and multi-states duration models. As in Heckman and Walker
[12] and Heckman, Hotz, and Walker [14], I estimate a multi-state model with unobserved
heterogeneity, using the non parametric maximum likelihood estimator described in Heckman
and Singer [10].
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the regulatory
framework characterizing the Italian labor market in the last two decades. Section 3 describes
the data sources and presents in detail the results of the empirical analysis of the data
regarding changes in labor force composition, transitions, and wages. Section 4 describes
the search model. Section 5 presents two approaches to test the model: estimation and
calibration. According to the findings, I provide conclusions regarding the change in welfare
for different categories of workers. The last section (Section 6) concludes the paper and
discusses future research.
2 Changes in the Italian Labor Market Regulatory
Framework4
Since 1995 many reforms have been approved in Italy with the specific intent of increasing
labor market flexibility. To achieve this goal, short-term employment contracts have been
introduced as a versatile instrument. Specifically, the objectives of the interventions, in
accordance with the European guidelines, can be summarized in the following key points:
increasing labor force participation, boosting employment, and reducing unemployment es-
pecially among young people. Indeed, in the nineties, the Italian labor market statistics
regarding employment, unemployment, and labor force participation were much worse com-
pared to other European countries. The labor force participation rate was one of the lowest
in Europe, especially among women (44% compared to the average 54% among the EU
4See Tealdi [26] for an extensive description of these reforms.
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countries5); young and long term unemployment rates were very high (31% and 70% respec-
tively compared to the average 16% and 44% among the EU countries)6; the employment
rate was quite low, particularly among women (36% compared to the average 49% among
the EU countries7). The Italian government promptly implemented new reforms to help, in
particular, the weakest groups of workers: women, young, unemployed, and low educated.
Due to the nature of these contracts and due to the government subsidies, their costs were
much lower compared to permanent contracts. These features would have allowed firms to
manage their workforce in a more flexible way, according to specific needs, and would have
reduced the cost burden pending on the employers, triggering a more competitive market.
In Italy short-term contracts were already present in the 60s, but they were un-
derutilized until 1995, when for the first time some new forms of limited length contracts
were independently regulated. Before 1995, only two types of quasi substitute short-term
contracts were available: apprenticeship and CFL (Contract aiming at training workers).
Together they were covering less than 10% of the total number of contracts. Their objective
was dual. Not only they offered the opportunity of working, but they also included a re-
markable amount of training on the job.8 It is extremely important to clarify that for both
types of contracts age was a strict requirement. Only young people qualified for this type of
contract. The age threshold changed over time since their introduction, however individuals
older than 34 years old could not be hired on any of the two short-term contracts.
Since 1995, gradually, many types of short-term contracts were regulated according to
the specific needs of firms in different sectors and industries, in order to boost further their
utilization. The key novelty was that age was not anymore listed among the eligibility crite-
ria. The market responded positively to this set of reforms and the utilization of short-term
contracts increased consistently over time. In particular the share of short-term employment
raised from 7% in 1994 to over 13% in 20089. The number of people hired short-term in
2003 was more than 20 times bigger than the number of people hired short-term in 199510.
Figure 1 shows the number of short-term contracts as a share of the total number of signed
contracts.
In order to evaluate the effect of the recent changes in the Italian labor market, I
focus on the overall effect of these reforms. In particular, I analyze the differences in the
labor market before 1995 and after 2003. I describe the data and present the results in the
following paragraphs.
5Average rate across 19 European countries. Year: 1990. Source: OECD.
6Average rate across 19 European countries. 15-24 years old cohort. Unemployment duration longer than
1 year. Year: 1990. Source: OECD.
7Average rate across 19 European countries. Year: 1990. Source: OECD.
8They differed in the length of the contract itself and in the training required. The apprenticeship
contract was in general longer and demanded more training. Controls for training were much stricter for
apprenticeship and were organized at both national and local levels.
9Source: OECD
101004 individuals were hired short-term in 1995. 14505 individuals were hired short-term in 2003. Source:
WHIP.
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3 Descriptive Analysis
3.1 Data Sources
Our empirical analysis is based on two data sets offering complementary information.
The Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) [20] is a sample survey con-
ducted by the Bank of Italy every two years. The data collection started in the sixties
with the aim of gathering information on the incomes and savings of the Italian households.
Today, SHIW is one of the most widely used sources of information on socio-demographic
characteristics, labor force status, income, savings, and wealth of the Italian population.
The sample used in the most recent surveys comprises about 8,000 households (24,000 indi-
viduals), distributed over approximately 300 Italian municipalities. The target population
of SHIW consists of the Italian resident population.
Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) [7] is a database of individual work histories,
based on the National Social Security Institute’s administrative archives. The reference pop-
ulation consists of individuals, Italian and foreign, who have worked in Italy for the whole or
only part of their working career. A large representative sample has been extracted from this
population. Overall the sample consists of a dynamic population of about 700,000 people.
For each of these individuals the main episodes of their working careers are observed. The
complete list of observations includes information on working contracts, retirement spells,
social benefits, and workers, jobs and firms characteristics. The data do not include informa-
tion on public sector workers or freelancers (lawyers or notaries), who have an independent
security fund. The period of observation spans from 1985 to 2004.
3.2 Data Description
Through the analysis of the data, I can analyze the changes in the labor market after the
reforms regarding labor force composition, employment and unemployment rates, transitions
across states, and wages.
In this section, I present the main patterns found in the data. I can summarize them
in four categories: the investigation of the characteristics of the workers hired short-term;
the analysis of the labor force composition; the evaluation of the wage difference across types
of contracts; and the study of the transitions across states. Having a complete picture of the
labor market changes in mind, I will be able to design a model, which is able to replicate
the evidence found in the data.
3.2.1 Characteristics of the workers hired short-term
To investigate the characteristics of the workers hired short-term, I focus on age and gender
of the workers, education level, and occupation. Table 1 shows that fixed term contracts
are more common among young individuals. However, since 1995 the share of older people
hired on a short-term basis has been consistently increasing (Figure 2). Gender is not an
important feature to discriminate between short-term and permanent positions. In general,
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less educated people are more likely to be hired on short-term contracts. Among other
categories, surprisingly, the most likely to be hired short-term are the ones with a 3 year
college degree (19%), followed by those with a post graduate degree (17%). Finally, I observe
the distribution of contracts across occupation. Most of the consultants are temporary hired.
Among others, blue collar workers and teachers are the categories of people more likely to
be hired short-term, while white collar workers and managers are mostly hired permanently.
Controlling for these individual characteristics, I perform a probit regression. Table 2
shows the results. Female workers have approximately 6% higher chances to be hired short-
term. By age groups, it appears that belonging to the 15- 24 year old age group strongly
increases the likelihood of having a temporary job (+17%). Moreover, young people in their
thirties11 are more likely to be hired short-term; their chances are approximately 6% higher
than older age groups. Both high level and low level of education play a significant role in
explaining the probability to have a short-term job. Surprisingly having a five year bachelor
degree raises the chance of being hired temporarily. In particular, the interaction effect
of high education level (bachelor’s degree) and young age (25-34 year old) is positive and
significant. This confirms the findings of Barbieri and Scherer (2009). Managers as well as
white collars and teachers have higher chances to be hired permanently compared to blue
collar workers.
From this analysis I can conclude that people who are more likely to be hired short-
term are females, young, and low qualified. They are in general poorly educated. However, I
can also identify a group of more educated people belonging to the 25-34 year old age group
who have a greater chance to be hired short-term.
3.2.2 Labor force composition
The second goal is to analyze the labor force composition and, in particular, the transitions
of people between states (employment, unemployment, and out of the labor force). I perform
the statistical analysis according to age groups to investigate the presence of cohort effects.
The analysis is conducted over the period 1991-2006 by five age categories: 15-24 year old,
25-34 year old, 35-44 year old, 45-54 year old, and 55-64 year old. The graphs are shown in
Figure 3.
The 15-24 year old age group is characterized by a gradual, but constant decrease in
unemployment starting from 1997. Figure 3(a) suggests that the lower unemployment rate
is explained only by the increasing flow of workers outside the labor force. The employment
rate remains constant over time.12.
The 25-34 year old and 35-44 year old age groups can be analyzed together because
11belonging to the 25-34 year old age group
12These movements can be due to the fact that over the last fifteen years education has become more
and more valued and a larger number of young people attend college. This trend has been enhanced by
the implementation of policies targeting the achievement of higher levels of education. One of this reforms
increased the age for compulsory education to sixteen years old (previously fourteen). Another important
legislation approved in 1999 introduced a new and shorter college degree, consisting of only three years of
undergraduate classes (compared to the previous degree consisting of five years).
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they show a similar trend. For both cohorts the employment to population ratio slightly
increases. Unemployment is approximately constant and labor force participation slightly
decreases, but these movements are not very pronounced13(see Figure 3(b) and 3(c)).
Among the 45-54 year old age group, employment and labor force participation grow
significantly (by more than 10%) after 1997, while unemployment is approximately constant
(see Figure 3(d)). The patterns among the 55-64 year old age group appear similar but
delayed14 (Figure 3(e)). Therefore, I detect among these two cohorts a significant flow of
individuals moving from out of the labor force directly into employment.
In summary, it appears that the age group showing more dynamics is the 45-54 year
old age group. Even though the unemployment to population ratio does not show a negative
trend, many individuals, who were previously (before 1995), either not working or looking for
jobs, are employed after 1995. This investigation becomes more interesting when I identify
the people who were outside the labor force before and after the reforms.
In 1995 more than two thirds of the individuals out of the labor force belonging to
the 45-54 year old age group were female homemakers. This percentage is significantly lower
in 2006. In order to identify any trend among females, I need to isolate it from the trend of
increased female labor force participation across Europe in the last two decades. Looking at
Figure 4, I can notice that an increasing trend was present since the end of the seventies, but
after 1997 the fraction of females in the labor force grows clearly at a faster rate. Focusing
on the labor force participation for females older than 45, I can recognize a similar and even
more pronounced pattern.
3.2.3 Wages across types of contracts
The third objective of this section is to analyze how wages differ across types of contracts.
Data show that workers hired short-term tend to have lower income15. Figure 5 shows the
distribution of annual income across contracts types. Short-term contracts offer much lower
income compared to permanent contracts. This result captures at the same time the fact
that a short-term employee may not work for the entire year and that her income is lower
compared to a permanent employee. Moreover, this evidence can be attributed to specific
individual characteristics, as described in section 3.2.1. Breaking down the distribution of
income across contracts by cohort (Figure 6), I can notice that across all age groups workers
tend to face on average lower income if they are hired on short-term contracts compared
to permanent contracts. The distribution of income is wider for older cohorts, but the
short-term negative effects on income is persistent.
13around 5%.
14A pension reform in 1992 extended the pension age from 55 to 60 for women and from 60 to 65 for men.
Another reform in 1995 changed the way pensions are calculated, moving from salary-based to contribution-
based payments. Moreover it allowed retirement at 57 if welfare contributions have been paid for at least 35
years. Later reforms changed the retirement age for both women and men, but they became affective only
in 2008.
15For some specific types of short-term contracts, the law requires workers to be paid as much as workers
hired permanently, given the same work responsibilities. However, in general, there are no regulations
regarding wages for other types of short-term contracts.
8
To test for the presence of a wage premium for working permanently, I perform an
OLS regression. I consider as regressors some characteristics of the workers, the employers,
and the jobs.
As expected, being hired on a permanent position rather than a short-term position
significantly increases the earnings received by the worker. There is a premium for work-
ing permanently which is strongly significant even when controlling for individual and job
characteristics. Consequently, this premium can only be explained by some unobservable
factors.
3.2.4 Transitions across contracts
The objective of this section is to analyze the transitions across contracts. I focus on three
states: non-employment16, short-term employment and permanent employment. I investi-
gate how these transitions changed over time, before and after the labor market reforms.
I consider the pool of workers hired short-term in January 1995, January 2000 and
January 2003. Table 4 shows how the transitions from and to short-term contracts have
significantly changed. Approximately 30% of workers hired on a short-term basis in 1995
were at their first job experience, approximately 50% were coming from a situation of non-
employment and only 8% were transiting from another short-term contract. However, the
patterns are very different in 2000 and 2003. The percentages of workers at their first
job experience in 2000 and 2003 were respectively 4% and 3%. Approximately 7% of the
workers both in 2000 and 2003 were coming from non-employment condition. However, and
most importantly approximately 85% of workers in the beginning of the new century were
transiting from another short-term contract.
Afterwards, at expiration of the first job experience on a short-term contract approx-
imately 30% of the workers would move to another short-term contract in 1995, but this
percentage is up to approximately 50% in 2000 and 2003. The chance for workers to ex-
perience either a non-employment condition or another short-term contract after the first
experience on a short-term contract since 2000 is approximately 90% . The likelihood to
transit to a permanent position is down from 25% in 1995 to approximately 10% after 2000.
Among the individuals with previous working experience, the chance to move to a permanent
position is unchanged. However, before the reforms 50% of the workers would move to a
non-employment condition and 30% to a new short-term contract. Those percentages are
reversed after the reforms: 30% of the workers would move to a non-employment condition
and 50% to a new short-term contract after 2000.
In summary, from 1995 to 2003 I identify an important and significant change in
the transition patterns across types of contracts. After the reforms, sequences of short-term
contracts as well as cycles of short-term employment and non-employment became extremely
common. This is true particularly among workers who have no or little job experience.
Among more experienced workers the probability to transit to a permanent job does not
16In the data I do not observe whether the workers are unemployed or out of the labor force when they
are not working.
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change over time, but the chances to be employed (even though for a limited amount of
time) are much higher.
4 The Search Model
After collecting the empirical evidence, I proceed to model workers behaviour. From the
data description, I was able to infer that workers hired short-term are mostly young, poorly
qualified, and poorly educated. Sequences of short-term contracts became very common and
the associated wages are much lower compared to wages associated to permanent contracts.
Moreover, the labor force participation rate has increased significantly among older workers,
even after taking into account the increased female labor force participation trend. Having
this picture in mind, the objective is to design a model which is able to explain the changes
in labor force composition and transition patterns, as found in the data. The estimation
of the model will help drawing conclusions regarding the change in welfare for different
categories of workers and it will help inferring predictions for the future. I adapt the standard
Mortensen-Pissarides search model to the environment described above, introducing workers
heterogeneity and allowing for differentiated contracts. I describe the model before the
reforms, when only permanent contracts are available, and after the reforms, when both
permanent and short-term contracts are available. Workers are in one of the three states:
out of the labor force, unemployed, or permanently employed.
4.1 The Set up
In the economy there is a population of measure 1. Every instant a measure k of individuals
are born. They are inexperienced and they are out of the labor force. At rate m, which
is the parameter of a Poisson arrival process, they join the labor force as unemployed and
start looking for jobs. There are two types of workers defined by their productivity level,
h − type, with high level of productivity, and l − type, with low level of productivity. The
share of h−type workers is equal to p. The productivity of the workers is not revealed, hence
firms are not able to discriminate. For both types, the productivity level is the entry level
productivity y0. When they are hit by a productivity shock at rate λ > 0, their productivity
level may change. If they are h− type, their productivity level jumps up to y, with y > y0.
If they are l − type, their productivity level is unchanged and equal to y0. When the shock
hits, they become experienced. In this instant the productivity of the worker is common
knowledge. When the worker is experienced she may retire at a rate s and, after joining the
out of the labor force state, she may die at rate d. I define b as the value of the unemployment
benefits17.
Firms hire both inexperienced and experienced workers. I assume that the waiting time
until a shock hits the worker-firm match is distributed exponentially. Hence the probability
that the shock is realized is just the density of the distribution and the parameter of the
17The eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits are quite strict and explicitly require continuos work
experience.
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distribution is the rate at which the shock takes place. Firms without workers post vacancies
at a cost of c and they fill them with probability α, which is the parameter of a Poisson
arrival process. In equilibrium, job creation is governed by profit maximization by taking
into account expected revenue and cost of a new match. Negative shocks arrive to existing
matches at the Poisson rate δ. When this happens the productivity of the job is reduced to
zero and hence the match is dissolved.
Firms and workers come together via a matching function M(u, v) where u is the
rate of unemployment and v is the vacancy rate. This function is twice differentiable and
increasing in its arguments. It exhibits constant returns to scale. The flow of matches for
a vacancy can be defined as M(u, v)/v = α(θ) which is a differentiable decreasing function,
where θ is the tightness of the labor market defined by v/u. The flow of matches for an
unemployed worker can be defined as M(u, v)/u = µ(θ), which is an increasing function18.
All realized job matches yield a surplus. If the worker and the firm separate, each part will
have to go through a costly search process in order to meet its next partner. The surplus
of the match is shared between the parities. Here, I assume that the surplus is divided in
fixed proportions between the firm and the worker, through an asymmetric Nash Bargaining
process, where β represents the worker’s share. So, workers and firms bargain the specific
wage for each type of contracts and for each type of workers before the beginning of the
match and this wage changes only when the conditions of the contracts are altered.
Notationally speaking, I’m going to use XY and XO for any variable X referring
respectively to inexperienced (Young) and experienced (Old) workers.
4.2 The Benchmark Model
In this set up, only permanent contracts are available and firing is not allowed. The mecha-
nism works in this simple way: a firm looking for a worker posts a vacancy; when it decides
to hire a worker, it offers her a permanent contract. When the firm hires an inexperienced
worker, the firm doesn’t know whether the worker is h− type or l− type19. The productivity
of the worker is the entry level productivity y0. Suppose that a worker’s type is revealed at
rate λ. The worker becomes experienced. Independently on the worker’s type, the firm keeps
her within the workforce since firing is not allowed. In equilibrium the wage is going to be a
function of the proportion of h− type and l − type employed workers. At rate δ the match
may be destroyed and at rate sp20 the worker may retire. In which case, the firm opens a
new vacancy.
18Standard Inada conditions apply.
19In this scenario information is perfect. Further extensions of the model could include asymmetric infor-
mation and signaling.
20The subscript p denotes the permanent feature of the contract.
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4.2.1 The Firm’s Problem
There are two types of vacancies: for experienced and for inexperienced workers. When the
firm posts a vacancy, the Bellmann equations for the firm are:
rJVY = −cpy + αpy[JEY − JVY ]
rJVO = −cpo + αpo[(pJEHO + (1− p)JELO )− JVO ]
In the first equation it is easy to see that whenever the firm opens a vacancy for inexperi-
encedworkers it has to pay a cost cpy. The vacancy is filled at rate α
p
y and α
p
o respectively
with the permanent hiring of a inexperienced or an experienced worker. The parities bargain
the current wage and the wage they will earn when they will become experienced.
When the vacancy is filled with inexperienced or experienced, h − type and l − type
workers, the firm Bellman equations are respectively:
rJEY = y0 − wy − τ py + λ[p(JEHO − JEY ) + (1− p)(JELO − JEY )] + δ(JVY − JEY )
rJEHO = y − wo − τ po + δ(JVO − JEHO ) + sp(JVO − JEHO )
rJELO = y0 − wo − τ po + δ(JVO − JELO ) + sp(JVO − JELO )
When the inexperienced worker is hired, her productivity is the entry level productiv-
ity y0 and the firm pays her a wage wy. Moreover the firm has to pay welfare contributions
equal to τ py if the worker in inexperienced and τ
p
o if the worker in experienced. At rate λ the
firm learns whether the worker is h− type, with productivity level y > y0, or l − type with
unchanged productivity level. In both cases, the firm is forced to keep the worker since firing
is not allowed. At rate δ the match is destroyed and the firm opens a new vacancy. When
the worker is experienced she may retire at rate sp and the firm opens a new vacancy.
4.2.2 The Worker’s Problem
I can define the value of being unemployed for inexperienced and experienced workers as
rWUHY = µy[W
EH
Y −WUHY ]
rWULY = µy[W
EL
Y −WULY ]
rWUHO = b+ µo[W
EH
O −WUHO ]
rWULO = b+ µo[W
EL
O −WULO ]
Experienced workers of different productivity levels are eligible for unemployment
benefits b and they have the chance to be rehired after their match is dissolved. Indeed firms
do not know their productivity level and they are not able to tell them apart by looking at
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their working histories. The rate at which a worker finds a job is respectively µy and µo, for
inexperienced and experienced workers.
The value of being employed for inexperienced and experienced workers of both types
is
rWEHY = wy + λ[W
EH
O −WEHY ] + δ[max{WUHY ,WOLFY } −WEHY ]
rWELY = wy + λ[W
EL
O −WELY ] + δ[max{WULY ,WOLFY } −WELY ]
rWEHO = wo + δ[max{WUHO ,WOLFO } −WEHO ] + sp[WOLFO −WEHO ]
rWELO = wo + δ[max{WULO ,WOLFO } −WELO ] + sp[WOLFO −WELO ]
where
rWOLFY = 0
(r + d)WOLFO = pi
Inexperienced workers get a salary equal to wy. Their productivity is revealed to the
firm at rate λ: with probability p the workers are h − type and with probability (1 − p)
the workers are l − type. At rate δ the match is destroyed: the worker can decide whether
to exit the labor force or to join the unemployment pool. Since being inexperienced and
unemployed gives her some chances to find a job, while the utility of being out of the labor
force is zero, she chooses the latter. There are two ways an experienced employed worker
can lose her job: if the match is destroyed at rate δ or if she retires at rate sp. After retiring,
the worker joins the out labor force pool where she may die at rate d. While out of the
labor force she is eligible for a pension pi. If the match gets destroyed when the worker is
experienced, the worker can decide whether to join the unemployment pool, from which she
can exit, filling a vacancy for experienced workers, at rate µo, or whether to retire. The
former gives a positive utility b and the chance to be hired again, hence it is optimal for her
to join the unemployment pool.
4.2.3 Wage Determination and Equilibrium Conditions
Solving the problem above from the point of view of the firms and the workers, I obtain the
equilibrium equations21. I can use these expressions to compute the values for wages received
by inexperienced and experienced workers. I assume that the wages are determined using a
Nash Bilateral Bargaining mechanism and I define β as the fraction of surplus enjoyed by
the workers.
In this economy there are two wage levels: one for inexperienced workers and one
for experienced workers. Workers and firms decide upon the current and future wage levels
when they first meet and the permanent contract is signed. Firms are willing to pay to the
21See Appendix for details.
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workers, once they get experienced, the weighted average of the productivity of h− type and
l− type workers. The weights are given by the proportion of workers belonging to each type.
Indeed, when the firms sign the contract, they do not observe the workers’ productivity and
they are aware that firing is not allowed.
The sharing rules for the determination of the wage per each workers’ category are
described by the following equations:
β[JEY − JVY ] = (1− β)[p(WEHY −WUHY ) + (1− p)(WELY −WULY )]
β[p(JEHO − JVO ) + (1− p)(JELO − JVO )]
= (1− β)[p(WEHO −WUHO ) + (1− p)(WELO −WULO )]
The free entry conditions imply that on both markets (for experienced and inexperi-
enced workers) the values of the vacancies are equal to zero. Maximizing the total surplus,
I compute the wage setting condition for experienced workers and inexperienced workers.
Rearranging and plugging in the expressions for each value function, I can write the wages
as functions of the parameters of the model. I define θ as the tightness of the market per
each segment22.
wo = β[py + (1− p)y0 − τ po ] +
(
r + sp
r
)
((1− β)b+ βcpoθpo)
+ (1− β)[sp]
(
u
r + d
)
wy = β[y0 − τ py ] +
(r + λ)
r
βcpyθ
p
y −
λ
r
((1− β)b+ βcpoθpo)
In steady state, the measure of newborns is equal to the measure of people who die.
Moreover, the share of inexperienced and experienced people is constant over time.
4.3 The Model with Short-term Contracts
The model with short-term contracts differs from the benchmark model in the opportunity
for firms to hire workers either short-term or permanently. The main feature of the new
contracts is the establishment of the duration when the contract is stipulated. When the
firms open a vacancy for inexperienced workers, they can decide whether to offer a permanent
or a short-term contract. Short-term contracts are characterized by a more flexible structure:
they allow the firms to pay no firing costs at expiration, they are cheaper in terms of social
security and welfare fees, and they are associated with a more straightforward bureaucratic
process. However, in general, sequences of short-term contracts are not allowed. Whenever
22θpo =
µo
αpo
and θpy =
µy
αpy
.
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the short-term contract expires, at rate t, firms have to decide whether to hire the workers
permanently or whether to keep them short-term and re-bargain their wage. Permanent
contracts are always offered to experienced workers, who turn out to be more more productive
(h− type).
4.3.1 The Firm’s Problem
Keeping the same definitions of the parameters as described in section 4.1, I compute the
Bellmann equations for the firm.
In case the firms have a vacancy:
rJVY = max{−cs2y + αs2y[JESY − JVY ],−cp2y + αp2y[JEPY − JVY ]}
rJV HO = max{−cs2o + αs2o[JESHY − JV HO ],−cp2o + αp2o[JEPHO − JV HO ]
rJV LO = max{−cs2o + αs2o[JESLO − JV LO ],−cp2o + αp2o[JEPLO − JV LO ]}
Firms decide whether to offer a short-term or a permanent contract when they open a
vacancy for inexperienced workers or less productive workers. In case they have a vacancy
for more productive workers, they offer a permanent position. In the first equation it is easy
to see that whenever a firm opens a vacancy it has to pay a cost. If the opening position
offers a contract to an inexperienced worker the cost is cs2y
23, if the contract is short-term,
or cp2y
24 if the contract is permanent. If the vacancy offers a contract to an experienced
worker the cost is cp2o
25, if the contract is short-term, or cp2o if the contract is permanent. In
both situations, cs2y > c
s
2y and c
p
2o > c
s
2o
26. The vacancies offering a short-term contract to
inexperienced and experienced workers are filled respectively at rate αs2y and at rate α
s
2o. The
rates at which vacancies offering permanent contracts are filled are αp2y and α
p
2o respectively
for inexperienced and experienced workers.
In case the firms have filled positions:
rJEPY = y0 − wy − τ py + λ[p(JEPHO − JEPY ) + (1− p)(JEPLO − JEPY )]
+ δ[JVY − JEPY ]
rJESY = y0 − wy − τ sy + λ[p(max{JEPHO , JESHO } − JESY )
+ (1− p)(max{JEPLO , JESLO } − JESY )] + δ[JVY − JESY ]
+ t[JVY − JESY ]
rJEPHO = y − who − τ po + (δ + sp)[JV HO − JEHO ]
rJEPLO = y0 − wlo − τ po + (δ + sp)[JV LO − JELO ]
rJESLO = y0 − wlo − τ so + (δ + t+ ss)[JV LO − JELO ]
23The superscript s refers to short term contracts, while the subscript y refers to inexperienced(young).
24The superscript p refers to permanent contracts.
25The subscript o refers to experienced(old).
26The cost of opening a vacancy is always higher for permanent positions compared to short-term positions.
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Inexperienced workers have a productivity level equal to y0 and they get paid wy. Moreover
the firm has to pay social security fees τ py , if the worker is hired permanently, or τ
s
y , if the
worker is hired short-term. If a disruptive shock δ hits the match, the firm opens a new
vacancy. At rate λ the worker’s productivity is observed and she becomes experienced. If the
worker is hired short-term and she turns out to be less productive, the firm decides whether
to hire her permanently or on a short-term basis.
Experienced workers have a productivity level equal to y. The firms pay them a salary
equal to wo and cover the social security and welfare cost τo. Whenever the workers retire
or the match is hit by a disruptive shock or the short-term contract terminates, the firms
open a new vacancy.
In equilibrium it is more profitable for the firms to offer short-term contracts to
inexperienced workers because of the lower associated costs and the possibility of firing at no
cost at expiration of the contract. Moreover it is more profitable to offer short-term contracts
to less productive workers when their productivity is observed.
4.3.2 The Worker’s problem
I can define the value of being unemployed for inexperienced and experienced workers as
rWUHY = µ2y(W
EH
Y −WUHY )
rWULY = µ2y(W
EL
Y −WULY )
rWUHO = bh + µ
h
2o(W
EH
O −WUHO )
rWULO = bl + µ
l
2o(W
EL
O −WULO )
Whenever an inexperienced worker is unemployed, she is not eligible for unemployment
benefits and she finds a job at rate µ2y. Experienced h−type workers have higher opportunity
costs since they are eligible for unemployment benefits bh and their chance to find a job is µ
h
2o.
Experienced l − type workers are eligible for lower unemployment benefits bl since they do
not have a continuous working history (bh > bl). For simplicity, I normalize bl=0. However,
less productive workers are not exiting the labor force if hit by a disruptive shock. At rate
µl2o they can find a new short-term job. Hence, they spend their life going through cycles of
unemployment and short-term employment until they exit the labor force (discouraged) at
rate ss27.
The values of being employed for inexperienced and experienced workers are
rWEHY = wy + λ[W
EH
O −WEHY ] + t[WUHY −WEHY ] + δ[WUHY −WEHY ]
rWELY = wy + λ[W
EL
O −WELY ] + t[WULY −WELY ] + δ[WULY −WELY ]
rWEHO = w
h
o + δ[W
UH
O −WEHO ] + sp[WOLFO −WEHO ]
rWELO = w
l
o + δ[W
UL
O −WELO ] + t[WULO −WELO ] + ss[WOLFO −WELO ]
27s refers to short-term contract.
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where
rWOLFY = 0
(r + d)WOLFO = u
Inexperienced workers are always offered short-term contracts, since it is more prof-
itable for the firms. When an inexperienced worker is hired, her productivity is the entry
level productivity y0 and the firm pays her a wage wy. At rate λ the firm gets to know the
worker’s type. When the productivity of the worker is revealed she becomes experienced.
If she turns out to be h − type, at expiration the firm offers her a permanent contract and
the two parities re-bargain the wage. If at expiration she turns out to be l − type, the firm
decides whether to offer a permanent or a short-term contract. When l − type workers lose
their jobs, they are not out of the labor force as in the previous set up. Indeed, they have
the chance to be hired again at rate µlo on short-term contracts. If the short-term contract
expires before the productivity of the worker is revealed, the firm can not keep the worker
and opens a new vacancy for inexperienced workers. At rate δ matches are destroyed and
firms open new vacancies. When workers of both types are experienced, they may exit the
labor force at rate sp and ss if they are hired permanently or short-term respectively28 and
the firms open new vacancies. Once workers exit the labor force, they may die at rate d.
In this framework, there is no more pooling between h − type and l − type workers
and they do not compete for the same types of contracts. Each of the two categories, when
experienced, targets a specific segment of the market and each type bargains independently
its own wage.
4.3.3 Wage Determination and Equilibrium Conditions
Solving the problem above for workers and firms, I get the equilibrium system of equations29.
I can solve for the wage levels received by inexperienced and experienced workers. I assume
that the wage is determined using a Nash Bilateral Bargaining mechanism and I define β to
be the fraction of the surplus enjoyed by the workers.
In this economy there are three wage levels, one for each type of worker: inexperi-
enced and experienced, h− type and l − type.
The following sharing rules apply to the specific categories:
β[JEPHO − JV HO ] = (1− β)[WEHO −WUHO ]
β[JESLO − JV LO ] = (1− β)[WELO −WULO ]
β[JESY − JVY ] = (1− β)[p(WEHY −WUHY ) + (1− p)(WELY −WULY )]
28I expect that ss > sp since workers hired short-term can exit the labor force either because they want
to retire or because they are discouraged.
29See Appendix for details.
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The free entry conditions imply that the value of the vacancies for each segment of the
market is equal to zero. Solving for the equilibrium wages, I get the wage setting condition
for each type of worker. Rearranging and plugging in the corresponding expressions per
each value function, I obtain the wage levels for the three categories of workers as functions
of the parameters of the model. I define θ as the tightness of the market per each specific
segment30.
who = β[y − τ po ] +
(r + sp)
r
((1− β)bh + βcp2oθp2o)− (1− β)sp
(
u
r + d
)
wlo = β[y0 − τ so ] +
(r + ss)
r
(βcs2oθ
s
2o)− (1− β)ss
(
u
r + d
)
wy = β[y0 − τ sy ] + β
(r + λ)
r
cs2yθ
s
2y −
λ
r
[
p((1− β)bh + βcp2oθp2o)
+ (1− β)(1− p)(cs2oθs2o)
]
5 Model Testing
Solving the two models described in sections 4.2 and 4.3, I can compute the equilibrium
employment, unemployment, and labor force participation rates for inexperienced and expe-
rienced workers as functions of the parameters of the models. Using these expressions, I can
assign values to the parameters in order to match the rates found in the data. The objective
is to compute the average lifetime income for an individual from the beginning of her working
career until her retirement, before and after the reforms. There are two approaches I can
follow to reach this goal. I can estimate the parameters of the model or I can calibrate them.
In the following section I will illustrate advantages and disadvantages of both approaches.
Some welfare conclusions will be inferred based on the findings.
5.1 Estimation
5.1.1 The statistical model
Models with survival data characterized by multiple types of failures or events are referred as
competing risk models. Since this paper deals with more general event history data, inferred
by observing individuals over time and containing information on the times of occurrence
of certain events and the types of events that occur, I consider a further extension of the
competing risk model, the multi-state model. In the latter, the various events are considered
as transitions from one state to another and a state structure specifies the diverse states
(absorbing or transient) and defines the possible future transitions. Each individual may
experience a certain number of events over time, i.e. go through the possibly recurrent
states, with transition times being arbitrary and measured on a continuous timescale.
30θp2o =
µh2o
αp2o
, θs2o =
µl2o
αs2o
, θs2y =
µ2y
αs2y
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The main features I am interested in are:
• Flexible modelling of baseline transition intensities,
• Inclusion time-varying covariate effects,
• Inclusion of frailty terms (i.e. subject specific random effects) to account for unobserved
heterogeneity.
In particular, the latter represents a key point in the estimation for two reasons.
First, not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity can cause the estimates to be biased,
and, second, I do not observe in the data any variables describing the productivity of the
workers. This is a key element in the model, and consequently I need to account for it
in the estimation introducing an unobserved heterogeneity component. Specifically, I es-
timate this model following an approach based on the nonparametric maximum likelihood
(NPMLE) estimation procedure described in Heckman and Singer [10]. This procedure ap-
proximates any distribution function of unobservable with a finite mixture distribution. The
approximation is constructed to maximize sample likelihood. Using the notation of Heckman
and Singer [11], I assume that an individual working history evolves in the following way.
The process starts at calendar time t = 0. I define a finite state continuous time process
{Y (t), T > 0}, Y (t) ∈ N¯ , where the set of possible states is finite (N¯ = 0, 1, ..., C;C < ∞).
Let R = k, k ∈ N¯ , denote the value assumed by Y (t) at the kth transition time. Transitions
occur at or after t = 0. In this notation, Y (t) records the individual’s state at time t. An
individual begins her working career at time zero, Y (t) = R = 0, and waits there a random
length of time. The multi state hazard rate for the transition from state i to state j takes
the form
hij(tij | x′βij, cijθ)
where i denotes the origin state and j denotes the destination state, tij is the duration
in state i which exits in state j, x is a vector of observed variables (possibly time varying), βij
is a vector of associated coefficients, θ is a scalar unobservable, and cij is a transition specific
factor loading. Specifying the functional form for the hazard, it is possible to estimate the
parameters of the hazard as well as the population distribution of the unobservables.
A general multi state computer program, CTM, applicable to multi state competing
risks models is used to estimate the model. The program specifies the conditional hazard
function for the transition from state i to state j in the following way:
hij(tij | x′βij, cijθ) = exp
(
γ0ij +
K∑
k=1
γkij(t
λijk
ij − 1)/λkij + x′βij + cijθ
)
Two features of this program are particularly suitable for the type of estimation I want to
perform. First, it accommodates general forms of duration dependence as special cases of the
previous equation. In particular, setting βij = 0, cij = 0, λ1ij = 0 and γ2ij = 0 specializes to
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a conventional Weibull hazard, to a Gompertz hazard if λ1ij = 1 and γ2ij = 0, to a quadratic
hazard if λ1ij = 1 and λ2ij = 2, and to an exponential hazard if γ1ij = γ2ij = 0. Allowing
βij 6= 0 and cij 6= 0 generalizes classical duration models to accommodate for general time
varying regressors and unobservables. Moreover, the mixing distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity component θ can be estimated as a normal, log-normal, log-gamma or by any
extensions of the Heckman and Singer [10] non parametric maximum likelihood estimator.
5.1.2 Identification
To estimate the model I use the WHIP database. This data set provides an excellent source
of information. Indeed, the entire working history of a relevant sample of the population is
observed.
In the model, workers are not homogenous: there are more productive (h− type) less
productive (l− type), inexperienced, and experienced workers, who have different chances to
be hired and fired. In order to estimate the parameters, which are specific to each type, I
need to be able to differentiate these four groups of workers. Unfortunately, the data do not
provide enough information to characterize each productive category.
To identify whether the workers are experienced or inexperienced, I can use both age
and experience of the workers. In particular, I observe the entire working history of each
individual and as such I can compute the total accumulated working experience up to date.
However, I can not identify the productivity level of the workers. To solve this issue, I am
going to control for unobserved heterogeneity using the Heckman and Singer non parametric
maximum likelihood estimator. In particular, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity per
each specific transition, I will capture how heterogeneity with respect to productivity affects
the hazard rates across states.
In terms of individual characteristics, the data set I am using provides me with infor-
mation regarding the gender and the age of the individuals.
In the pre-reforms economy only permanent contracts are available. In the data a small
percentage of workers is hired on a short-term basis before 1995 due to the pre-existence of
two types of short-term contracts. I exclude those individuals from the data set. In the
post- reforms economy, it is more profitable for firms to hire inexperienced workers on a
short-term basis, and hence I do not consider observations where workers are hired directly
on a permanent basis when they first join the labor force.
A disadvantage of the data set is that I do not observe the status of the workers when
they are not employed. They may be either unemployed or out of the labor force, but I can
not tell these two categories apart. Hence, the parameters I estimate will include the rate at
which different types of workers enter and exit the employment state. The future availability
of a more complete data set31 will enrich and improve the estimation.
31Such as Veneto Worker Histories, which includes employer employee matched data regarding the region
of Veneto in Italy and which will be provided by Giuseppe Tattara.
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5.1.3 The empirical results
I account for five types of transitions across four states. In particular, I consider unemploy-
ment and employment, each of them for experienced and inexperienced workers. I analyze the
transitions back and forth from unemployment to employment for both types of workers and
an extra transition from employment while inexperienced to employment while experienced.
In the first estimation, I consider an exponential hazard model accounting for non-parametric
transition-specific heterogeneity.
In Table 5 and Table 6, Panel A reports empirical estimates of the transition param-
eters before the reforms; panel B reports the estimates in the post-reforms. All the numbers
defining the transitions rates are significant. Table 5 reports estimates when no individual
characteristics are taken into account; Table 6 accounts for age and gender of the workers.
The most important finding is that after the reforms the worker turnover is much higher.
Among all transitions (unemployment to employment and employment to unemployment)
and across both specification, the estimations show a significant increase in the transition
rates in the post-reforms economy. Only the hazard rate regarding the transition from in-
experienced employment to experienced employment does not change as a consequence of
the reforms. Age and gender do not show a clear pattern. It seems that males were more
unlikely to move to non-employment in the pre-reforms economy, while after the reforms the
turnover of experienced workers is higher for the female group. The role played by age is
similar before and after the reforms.
5.2 Calibration
In order to capture the main changes caused by the transition from a system of solely per-
manent contracts to a system where permanent and short-term contracts coexist, I perform
a calibration exercise. The comparison of macro aggregates, such as employment, unem-
ployment, and labor force participation rates, as well as wages, before and after the reforms,
will provide me with some hints regarding the changes in welfare for different categories of
people, as identified in the model. Two are the main criteria used to select the parameters:
the first is the coherence with the previous literature and the second one is the matching
with the labor force statistics extracted from the data (SHIW and WHIP). In particular, our
objective is to match the rates of unemployment, employment, and labor force participation,
as well as the average wages for different categories of workers in 1995 (before the reforms)
and in 2006 (after the reforms).
Following Blanchard and Landier [16], I consider the length of a month as the unit
time period and I choose the parameters of the calibration as described in Table 7.
Using these values, I can reconstruct the percentages of employment, unemployment,
and labor force participation for productive (h− type), unproductive (l− type), experienced,
and inexperienced workers, before and after the reforms. I am able to match approximately
the values computed using the SHIW data set for the year 1995 and 2006. The results
are shown in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively for experienced and inexperienced workers.
Regarding inexperienced workers, I can reproduce an approximately unchanged labor force
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composition. Indeed, in the data and in the model, the employment rate registers an increase
of few percentage points which corresponds to the same decrease of the unemployment rate;
the labor force participation rate is constant. The main change to be highlighted is the type of
contract on which inexperienced workers are hired: before the reforms they were permanently
hired, after the reforms they are hired short-term. Regarding experienced workers, through
the calibration exercise, I can recreate the sharp increase in labor force participation rate
present in the data, almost completely absorbed by the increase in the employment rate.
In terms of wages, inexperienced workers face a slight increase in the received salary.
Regarding experienced workers, I observe contrasting trends. The salary of productive h −
type workers is much higher after the reforms; the salary of unproductive l − type workers
is lower. The formers are the only ones hired permanently and as such they are able to
enjoy a wage premium. Indeed, the pooling with unproductive workers, present in the pre-
reforms economy, is no longer part of the system. Unproductive workers, who were hired
permanently before, are now hired short-term and, as such, they enjoy lower wages.
Using the parameter values described above, I compute the present value average
lifetime income for productive (h− type) and unproductive (l− type) workers as well as the
present value average income for inexperienced and experienced workers. The findings are
shown in Table 10.
Inexperienced workers are worse off after the reforms. Even though their wage level
is similar to the wage level in the pre-reforms economy, due to the nature of the short-term
contracts on which they are hired, it takes longer for their productivity to be revealed. Hence
they alternate spells of unemployment and short-term employment and their overall income
is lower.
Among experienced workers, more productive workers fare better. Even though they
are in the labor force for a longer span of time, they are the only ones hired permanently.
In the pre-reforms economy, they were penalized by the pooling of more and less productive
workers within the same contract type and, consequently, they were facing a much lower
wage. In the post-reforms, they enjoy a much higher salary, which is a function solely of
their own productivity level.
Less productive experienced workers are worse off after the reforms. They have higher
chances to work in the post-reforms, but they have no chance to be hired permanently. They
alternate spells of short-term employment and unemployment and they face a lower salary.
Hence, they spend more time in the labor force, but their average monthly income is much
lower compared to their income in the pre-reforms economy.
Considering the present value lifetime income for all types of workers, from the instant
they join the labor force until they retire, I can identify a decrease of the overall average
income for less productive workers as well as increase in income for more productive workers
(see Table 11). This result is not surprising. Less productive workers, indeed, are worse
off both when inexperienced and when they turn experienced. However, more productive
workers, who enjoy much higher wages when experienced, are able to compensate for their
losses occurred when inexperienced.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper I study both theoretically and empirically the effect of the introduction of
short-term employment contracts on the labor market. The objective is to draw both quali-
tative and quantitative conclusions regarding the change in welfare for different categories of
people. I analyze the data to find patterns, which can be explained by a search model. Data
from the Italian labor market show that people hired short term are mostly young, female,
inexperienced, less educated, and poorly qualified. Short-term contracts, which are associ-
ated with lower wages, often come in sequences. Labor force participation has increased in
particular among older workers. To explain these patterns, I develop a standard Mortensen
and Pissarides search model allowing for workers heterogeneity with respect to productivity
and differentiated contracts. I analyze the career path of individuals before the reforms,
when only permanent contracts are available, and after the reforms, when permanent and
short-term contracts coexist.
I estimate the model according to the Heckman and Singer [10] non parametric max-
imum likelihood estimation procedure accounting for transition specific unobserved hetero-
geneity. I find that turnover is higher across all transitions from employment to unemploy-
ment and vice versa for different categories of workers. Limitations in the estimation come
from the nature of the data, which do not provide sufficient information regarding worker’s
personal characteristics and firm’s features. Using italian panel data, I perform the calibra-
tion of the model in order to quantify the change in welfare for different categories of workers.
I find that inexperienced workers are worse off after the reforms. Experienced workers, if
more productive, enjoy higher wages and the benefits of permanent contracts. Less pro-
ductive experienced workers do not have the opportunity to be hired on a permanent basis
in the post-reforms economy. Hence, they fall into cycles of unemployment and short-term
employment, facing lower salaries and reduced benefits. Accounting for the lifetime income,
I can additionally identify, in the post reforms era, a decrease in income for less productive
individuals as well as an increase in income for more productive workers.
Future research includes the estimation of the model using matched employer-employee
data32. This will allow me to provide a complete overview of the effect of short-term contracts
on both workers and firms. Indeed, I will be able to compute firm profits before and after
the reforms and to draw conclusions regarding the state of the economy. The availability of
these data will also open the door to extensions of the model with additional worker and firm
dynamics. The model I have developed in this paper can be considered a baseline model,
which is suitable for many extensions in different directions. Thus far, I have considered
only one type of job that can be performed under different types of contracts (permanent
or short-term). It would be interesting to explore the allocation problem of workers among
different job types, low-skilled and high-skilled, and types of contracts. The allocation is-
sue is particularly interesting because intuitively one could think that low-skilled jobs are
associated with short-term contracts and high-skilled jobs with permanent ones. However, a
32The data set Veneto Worker Histories provided by Giuseppe Tattara regarding the region of Veneto in
Italy will be used.
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non-intuitive cross-equilibrium might exist. In addition, I plan to perform simulation stud-
ies, where parameters, which in my search-model define features of short-term employment
contracts, are perturbed to target lower unemployment rates and to minimize the loss of life-
time income. I intend to investigate whether the increased European labor market flexibility,
achieved through the introduction of short-term contracts, is comparable to the American
labor market flexibility. I can readily simulate this scenario by incorporating in the model
the assumption that there are no firing costs associated with permanent contracts (such as in
the USA). This would allow me to quantify and compare the welfare for different categories
of people under different labor market regulations and different degrees of flexibility.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Equilibrium conditions
7.1.1 The benchmark model
The firm problem
JEHO =
y − wo − τ po
(r + δ + sp)
JELO =
y0 − wo − τ po
(r + δ + sp)
JEY =
y0 − wy − τ py
(r + λ+ δ)
+
λp
(r + λ+ δ)
JEHO +
λ(1− p)
(r + λ+ δ)
JELO
The worker problem
WEHY =
wy
(r + λ+ δ)
+
λ
(r + λ+ δ)
WEHO +
δ
(r + λ+ δ)
µy
(µy + r)
WEHY
WELY =
wy
(r + λ+ δ)
+
λ
(r + λ+ δ)
WELO +
δ
(r + λ+ δ)
µy
(µy + r)
WELY
WEHO =
wo
(r + δ + sp)
+
δ
(r + δ + sp)
WUHO +
sp
(r + δ + sp)
WOLFO
WELO =
wo
(r + δ + sp)
+
δ
(r + δ + sp)
WULO +
sp
(r + δ + sp)
WOLFO
The equilibrium wage for experienced workers:
wo = β[py + (1− p)y0 − τ po ] + (1− β)(r + sp)(pWUHO + (1− p)WULO )
+ (1− β)[sp]WOLFO
The equilibrium wage for inexperienced workers:
wy = β[y0 − τ py ] + (1− β)(r + λ)[pWUHY + (1− p)WULY ]
− (1− β)λ[pWUHO + (1− p)WULO ]
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7.1.2 The model with short-term contracts
The Firm problem
JEPHO =
y − who − τ po
(r + δ + sp)
JESLO =
y0 − wlo − τ so
(r + δ + t+ ss)
JESY =
y0 − wy − τ sy
(r + t+ δ + λ)
+
λ
(r + t+ δ + λ)
(pJEPHO + (1− p)JESLO )
In equilibrium it is more profitable for the firms to offer short-term contracts to inexperienced
workers. Indeed the cost is lower and it is less risky, since the firms do not know the
productivity of the workers and permanently hired workers can not be fired.
The Worker problem
WEHO =
who
(r + δ + sp)
+
δ
(r + δ + sp)
WUHO +
sp
(r + δ + sp)
WOLFO
WELO =
wlo
(r + δ + t+ ss)
+
(δ + t)
(r + δ + t+ ss)
WULO +
ss
(r + δ + t+ ss)
WOLFO
WEHY =
wy
(r + δ + λ+ t)
+
λ
(r + δ + λ+ t)
WEHO +
(δ + t)
(r + δ + λ+ t)
WUHY
WELY =
wy
(r + δ + λ+ t)
+
λ
(r + δ + λ+ t)
WELO +
(δ + t)
(r + δ + λ+ t)
WULY
The equilibrium wage for h− type experienced workers:
who = β[y − τ po ] + (1− β)(r + sp)WUHO − (1− β)spWOLFO
The wage setting condition for l − type experienced workers:
wlo = β[y0 − τ so ] + (1− β)(r + ss)WULO − (1− β)ssWOLFO
Finally, the wage setting condition for inexperienced workers:
wy = β[y0 − τ sy ] + (1− β)(r + λ)[pWUHY + (1− p)WULY ]
− (1− β)λ[pWUHO + (1− p)WULO ]
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Figure 1: Percentage of short-term contracts (as a share of total contracts). Vertical lines
correspond to years of introduction of new reforms. Source: Work Histories Italian Panel
(WHIP).
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Figure 2: Short-term contracts age distribution in years (a) 1995, (b) 1997, (c) 2000, and
(d) 2004. Source: Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP).
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Figure 3: Labor market statistics (employment, labor force, unemployment) across age
groups (a) 15-24, (b) 25-34, (c) 35-44, (d) 45-54, and (e) 55-64. Source: Survey on Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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Figure 4: Female employment rate as a % of age group population. Source: Survey on
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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Figure 5: Distribution of yearly net income in Euro for workers in permanent and short-
term contracts. Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Figure 6: Distribution of yearly net income in Euro for workers in permanent and short-
term contracts by age groups (a) 15-24, (b) 25-34, (c) 35-44, (d) 45-54, and (e) 55-64. Source:
Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
34
Table 1: Distribution of contracts (2006)
Share of Long Short
population term term
(%) (%) (%)
Qualification
Blue collar 49.06 82.34 15.05
White collar 35.59 92.05 7.95
Teacher 6.77 80.58 19.42
Junior manager 6.09 92.62 7.38
Senior manager 2.49 98.49 1.51
Age
15 - 24 6.27 58.55 41.45
25 - 34 23.49 80.14 19.86
35 - 44 34.85 88.02 11.98
45 - 54 25.66 92.12 7.88
55 - 64 9.73 92.05 7.95
Gender
Male 57.53 86.59 13.41
Female 42.47 84.65 15.35
Education
No education 0.23 38.82 61.18
Primary 5.07 77.35 22.65
Junior high 33.39 84.26 15.74
Vocational 10.03 87.27 12.73
High school 37.80 87.57 12.43
3 year Bachelor’s 1.73 84.97 15.03
5 year Bachelor’s 11.45 87.62 12.38
Postgraduate 0.30 86.40 13.60
Geographical location
North 53.90 88.98 11.02
Center 19.09 89.93 10.17
South 27.01 76.47 23.53
Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth
(SHIW).
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Table 2: Probit regression (2006)
Short-term Short-term Short-term Short-term Short-term
Female 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
South 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Bachelor’s 0.013 0.016
(0.011) (0.012)
Manager -0.051∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
White Collar -0.066∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Teacher -0.055∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009)
Age -0.004∗∗∗
(0.000)
Age Group 15 - 24 0.191∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Age Group 25 - 34 0.068∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.070) (0.010) (0.010)
Master’s 0.043 0.059 0.058
(0.133) (0.125) (0.131)
5 Year Bachelor’s 0.056∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
3 Year Bachelor’s 0.033 0.046 0.043
(0.038) (0.040) (0.039)
Primary/Junior High 0.052∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.008) (0.009)
Primary 0.048∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
No Education 0.260∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.053) (0.052)
Bachelor’s 25-34 0.121∗∗∗
(0.041)
Number of
6193 6055 6055 6055 6055
observations
NOTES: “Short-term” takes value 1 if the contract is short-term and value 0 otherwise.
Bachelor’s 25 - 34 is an interaction variable, which captures the category of people with
a Bachelor’s or higher degree belonging to the 25 - 34 age group.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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Table 3: Log wage regression (2006)
Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage Log wage
Permanent 0.223∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Male 0.271∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.101)
South -0.122∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Bachelor’s 0.235∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Manager 0.238∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Age 0.228∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 -0.688∗∗∗ -0.655∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.084∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age Group 15 - 24 -0.167∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Age Group 25 - 34 -0.141∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Master’s 0.050∗∗∗
(0.093)
5 Year Bachelor’s 0.163∗∗∗
(0.015)
3 Year Bachelor’s 0.052∗∗∗
(0.041)
Constant 6.314∗∗∗ 5.818∗∗∗ 5.830∗∗∗ 6.742∗∗∗ 6.742∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.066) (0.066) (0.017) (0.017)
Number of
5795 5696 5694 5694 5694
observations
R2 0.254 0.315 0.322 0.314 0.314
NOTES: ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 1% level.
Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW).
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Table 4: Workers transiting from/to short-term contracts (as a % of workers hired on a
short-term basis)
1995 2000 2003
First job 0.3137 0.0391 0.0307
Panel A: Transitions to the short-term contract
Non-employment 0.4702 0.0686 0.0754
Short-term ⇒ Short-term 0.0777 0.8384 0.8549
Long-term 0.1384 0.0539 0.0390
Panel B: Transitions from the short-term contract
Short-term
Non-employment 0.4730 0.4037 0.4596
⇒ Short-term 0.2952 0.4754 0.4350
(first job) Long-term 0.2317 0.1209 0.1054
Short-term
Non-employment 0.4804 0.2787 0.2977
⇒ Short-term 0.2917 0.4635 0.4717
(not first job) Long-term 0.2279 0.2579 0.2307
Number of observations 1004 12467 14505
Source: Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP).
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Table 5: Estimation results for transition hazard rates
Constant H-Factor
Panel A: Before the reforms
Non-employment(y) → Employment(y) 1.05 -0.07
(0.01) (0.02)
Employment(y) → Non-employment(y) -1.78 4.58
(0.03) (0.03)
Employment(y) → Employment(o) 1.18 -1.10
(0.00) (0.04)
Non-employment(o) → Employment(o) 0.53 1.14
(0.01) (0.01)
Employment(o) → Non-employment(o) -1.66 3.31
(0.00) (0.01)
Panel B: After the reforms
Non-employment(y) → Employment(y) 2.23 -1.96
(0.00) (0.01)
Employment(y) → Non-employment(y) 1.50 -1.00
(0.00) (0.03)
Employment(y) → Employment(o) 1.28 -0.06
(0.01) (0.04)
Non-employment(o) → Employment(o) 1.60 1.44
(0.00) (0.00)
Employment(o) → Non-employment(o) -1.17 2.81
(0.01) (0.01)
NOTES: y(young): inexperienced, o(old): experienced.
H factor allows for transition specific heterogeneity.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Panel A includes estimates regarding transitions pre-reforms.
Panel B shows estimates post-reforms.
39
Table 6: Estimation results for transition hazard rates
Constant Male Age H-Factor
Panel A: Before the reforms
Non-employment(y) → Employment(y) 1.04 -0.13 0.01 -0.05
(0.02) (1.42) (0.06) (0.02)
Employment(y) → Non-employment(y) -0.75 -20.41 -2.26 4.37
(0.03) (1.64) (0.07) (0.03)
Employment(y) → Employment(o) 1.57 5.72 -1.15 -1.06
(0.02) (1.26) (0.04) (0.04)
Non-employment(o) → Employment(o) 1.15 15.49 -2.06 1.27
(0.02) (1.30) (0.05) (0.01)
Employment(o) → Non-employment(o) -2.15 -22.60 2.29 3.44
(0.02) (1.44) (0.06) (0.01)
Panel B: After the Reforms
Non-employment(y) → Employment(y) 1.84 4.98 -3.46 1.64
(0.02) (1.35) (0.06) (0.01)
Employment(y) → Non-employment(y) 0.40 -1.04 -1.21 2.13
(0.03) (1.70) (0.09) (0.02)
Employment(y) → Employment(o) 1.39 12.11 -0.26 -0.37
(0.05) (3.01) (0.16) (0.03)
Non-employment(o) → Employment(o) 2.25 -23.51 -1.40 1.45
(0.01) (0.66) (0.03) (0.00)
Employment(o) → Non-employment(o) -0.27 -31.91 -1.26 2.85
(0.02) (0.93) (0.04) (0.01)
NOTES: y(young): inexperienced, o(old): experienced.
H factor allows for transition specific heterogeneity.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Panel A includes estimates regarding transitions pre-reforms.
Panel B shows estimates post-reforms.
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Table 7: Calibration parameter values
Parameter Pre-reforms Post-reforms
r 0.01 0.01
β 0.4 0.4
p 0.85 0.85
k 500 500
y0 1500 1500
y 2500 2500
b 500 500
cpo 1500 1500
csy — 1000
cso — 750
m 0.046 0.044
u 100 100
d 0.009 0.009
sp 0.0035 0.0032
ss — 0.005
δ 0.015 0.015
t — 0.1
λ 0.05 0.05
µy 0.14 0.22
µho 0.14 0.14
µlo — 0.18
αpy 0.10 —
αsy — 0.10
αpo 0.45 0.14
αso — 0.08
τpo 500 500
τpy 300 —
τ so — 200
τ sy — 100
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Table 8: Labor market statistics for experienced workers: data versus model
Data Model
Pre-reforms Post-reforms Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Total employment rate 58.2% 65.0% 58.3% 65.6%
Permanent employment rate
h− type — — 53.9% 43.8%
l − type — — 4.4% —
Short-term employment rate
l − type — — — 21.9%
Total unemployment rate 4.8% 5.4% 4.8% 5.2%
h− type — — 4.8% 5.0%
l − type — — — 0.2%
Total out of labor force rate 37.0% 29.6% 37.0% 29.2%
Average wage (in e)
h− type 1570 2040 1520 2000
l − type 1570 1370 1520 1406
Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and Work History Italian Panel
(WHIP)
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Table 9: Labor market statistics for inexperienced workers: data versus model
Data Model
Pre-reforms Post-reforms Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Total employment rate 39.4% 39.0% 39.0% 39.1%
Permanent employment rate
h− type — — 19.5% —
l − type — — 19.5% —
Short-term employment rate
h− type — — — 19.6%
l − type — — — 19.6%
Total unemployment rate 18.5% 16.5% 18.5% 16.3%
h− type — — 9.3% 8.2%
l − type — — 9.3% 8.2%
Total out of labor force rate 42.3% 44.5% 42.5% 44.5%
Average wage (in e) 1050 1120 1010 1100
Source: Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and Work History Italian Panel
(WHIP)
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Table 10: Welfare changes by worker’s types
Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Average working income
while in the labor force (1000 e)
Inexperienced 20.6 20.9
Experienced h− type 448.0 658.0
Experienced l − type 448.0 269.2
Average time
in the labor force (in months)
Inexperienced 22 26
Experienced h− type 309 339
Experienced l − type 309 262
Present value of total income
while in the labor force (1000 e)
Inexperienced 16.5 15.9
Experienced h− type 20.3 22.3
Experienced l − type 20.3 19.6
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Table 11: Lifetime income changes by worker’s types
Pre-reforms Post-reforms
Average working income
while in the labor force (1000 e)
h− type 365.7 375.5
l − type 365.7 155.5
Average time
in the labor force (in months)
h− type 267 291
l − type 267 212
Present value of total income
while in the labor force (1000 e)
h− type 40.4 50.0
l − type 40.4 30.3
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